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tematic formulations of belief, but rather in details. This task still awaits the patient study of competent scholars; and there is no field more fruitful for the historian of thought.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

MIND. July, 1910. *The Psychological Explanation of the Development of the Perception of External Objects* (I.) (pp. 305–321): H. W. B. JOSEPH. – Criticizes the doctrine of Professor Stout, as expounded in his "Groundwork of Psychology," Chapter IX., that we know an external world and that we gain this knowledge by a process psychologically traceable, in which we start from experiences merely of our own sensations. The theory fails to account for cognition of spatial relations. Discussion of cognition of external reality reserved for next installment. *The Cardinal Principle of Idealism* (pp. 322–336): R. B. PERRY. – Idealism, in its current technical sense, is a distinctively modern movement. True religion had to be defended against the claim of science to have alienated the world from man. Kant's "revolution" was a counter revolution through which the spectator again became the center of the system. The burden of idealism is a religious interpretation of nature, and its cardinal principle is that knowledge is a creative process. This is a fallacious inference from "the ego-centric predicament," or the circumstance that anything that is known or referred to is something known or referred to, and can not be at the same time unknown and unreferred to. The idealistic induction proceeds wholly by the method of agreement, because "the ego-centric predicament" forbids the use of the method of difference. "It is impossible to observe cases of unobserved things, even if there be any. But where this is the case, the method of agreement is worthless and the use of it is a fallacy." *Linguistic Misunderstandings* (pp. 337–355): HUGH MACCOLL. – Second installment. Perplexities that attach to the ideas the infinite and the finite are removed by letting the sign for equality signify "virtual equality" ($X = X + dx$) as well as absolute equality. Problems of matter and mind involve a conception of the soul. *The Sublime* (pp. 356–372): E. F. CARRITT. – A criticism of the theory of A. C. Bradley in his "Oxford Lectures on Poetry." Sublimity in the loose sense is beauty discovered in what bears a definitely hostile relation to our purposes or existence. Speaking strictly, only the absolute is sublime. Sublimity might be defined as the beauty of the absolute. *Discussions: Some Explanations in Reply to Mr. Bradley* (pp. 373–378): B. RUSSELL. – Mr. Bradley assumes a certain theory of relations and appeals to a sufficient reason. Mr. Russell defends external relations, and holds that a term may be related to itself ($2 + 2 = 4$). *Mr. Russell's Objections to Frege's Analysis of Propositions* (pp. 379–386): MISS E. E. C. JONES. – Frege's theory supplies an analysis of propositions of the form *S is P* which can be applied to all propositions of that form, and some theory of denotation which can be applied to all denotative terms. *Defi-*

nition in Symbolic Logic (pp. 387–389): A. T. SHEARMAN. – Seeks to elucidate the volitional character of definition, together with the position of definitions in reasoning, and the distinction to be drawn between definitions in symbolic logic and in philosophy. *Note on Aristotle's Theory of the Constructive Reason* (pp. 390–394): A. W. BENN. – Writer comments on a presumed error of himself and of Professor Adamson. Active reason is not to be identified with reason in act. Aristotle meant by "constructive reason" something equivalent to ego or self-conscious personality or rational self-consciousness. *Critical Notices:* August Messer, *Empfindung und Denken:* G. E. MOORE. Karl Joel, *Der Frei Wille:* C. S. MEYERS. James Sully, *The Teacher's Handbook of Psychology:* T. WHITTAKER. *New Books. Philosophical Periodicals. Note.*

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. October, 1910. *Voluntary Movement* (pp. 513–562) E. C. ROWE. – The author reports typewriting experiments, writing experiments, anatomical, physiological, and pathological data. The conclusion is drawn that "feeling is never the fundamental in a complex and highly voluntary activity." Voluntary movement differs from other kinds of movement in that it is essentially a form of control, which, in turn, means cognition. *An Experimental Study of Belief* (pp. 563–596): DR. OKABE. – Belief and its opposite are consciousnesses similar in nature. Belief and disbelief are more than mere acceptance, rejection, or emotional consciousness. Certainty-uncertainty are strongly affective, having a pleasant and unpleasant element, respectively. *A Preliminary Study of the Association-Reaction Consciousness* (pp. 597–602): R. L. GEISSLER. – A preliminary report of an introspective study of the "complex." The "complex" was found to be a group of ideas that are unpleasant. These ideas give a feeling of focal crowdedness soon to be followed by a single focal idea. *A Bibliography of the Scientific Writings of Wilhelm Wundt:* E. B. TITCHENER and L. R. GEISSLER. *William James—Commemorative Note. Subject Index and Names of Authors.*

Brown, William. The Use of the Theory of Correlation in Psychology. Cambridge: University Press. 1910. Pp. 83.

Bussell, F. W. Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1910. Pp. xi + 302.

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Jevons, F. B. The Idea of God in Early Religions. Cambridge: University Press. 1910. Pp. x + 170.

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Magnus, Philip. Educational Aims and Efforts, 1880–1910. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1910. Pp. xii + 288. 7s. 6d.

Ménard, A. Analyse et critique des principes de la psychologie de W. James. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1911. Pp. 467. 7 fr. 50.

Ostwald, Wilhelm. Die Forderung des Tages. Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft m. b. H. 1910. Pp. vi + 603.

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Ruge, Arnold. Die Philosophie der Gegenwart. Eine internationale Jahresübersicht. Heidelberg: Weiss'sche Universitätsbuchhandlung. 1910. Pp. xii + 531. 10s.

NOTES AND NEWS

At the meeting of the British Academy on January 18 Mr. Shadworth H. Hodgson read a paper on "Some Cardinal Points in Knowledge." Among the most prominent of these points were the following: that consciousness is the only evidence we have for anything whatever; that every empirically present moment of consciousness moves in two opposite directions of time at *once,* backwards into the past, and forwards into the future; that this circumstance compels us to distinguish between consciousness as a *knowing* (in which it is our evidence for everything) and the same consciousness as an *existent* (in which it is the dependent concomitant of some real condition or conditions, which are not consciousness); that the content of consciousness as a *knowing* is always found to be analyzable ultimately into distinguishable but inseparable elements, its so-called formal and material elements, time or time and space together being the formal, and some mode of feeling the material, while, taken as an *existent,* it appears as a self-objectifying process, having two aspects, the objective and the subjective; that physical matter is made known to us by the process of the simultaneous exercise of the sensations of sight and touch, including pressure, which gives us our first conception of reality in the full sense, namely, as a real condition of genesis; that physical matter, as known by sensations of touch with pressure, is a replica of the sensations by which it is known, which can not be said of any other sensation or feeling; that physical matter is at once the object and the real condition of genesis of new sensations, new not in respect of kind, but of occurrence, and the experience of physical matter is thus the point at which the physical world as known and our consciousness knowing it coincide, thus proving the latter to be true evidence of the former; that the nature of the specific qualities of sensation, *what,* for instance, sensations of touch, pressure, light, color, sound, heat, cold, pleasure, pain, and so on, *are*—this is incapable of being thought of as caused or conditioned by anything whatever; in their simplest shape they are *ultimates* in experience; they are a *revelation* in the strictest sense: that, since time or time and space together, which are their inseparable formal element, are infinite, that is, limitless in increase or decrease, we are compelled to admit the possibility of innumerable other modes of sensation than our own, and even of other kinds of formal elements than time and space,